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ABSTRACT
Trusted AI literature to date has focused on the trust needs of
users who knowingly interact with discrete AIs. Conspicuously
absent from the literature is a rigorous treatment of public trust in
AI. We argue that public distrust of AI originates from the under-
development of a regulatory ecosystem that would guarantee the
trustworthiness of the AIs that pervade society. Drawing from
structuration theory and literature on institutional trust, we offer
a model of public trust in AI that differs starkly from models driv-
ing Trusted AI efforts. We describe the pivotal role of externally
auditable AI documentation within this model and the work to be
done to ensure it is effective, and outline a number of actions that
would promote public trust in AI. We discuss how existing efforts
to develop AI documentation within organizations— both to inform
potential adopters of AI components and support the deliberations
of risk and ethics review boards —is necessary but insufficient assur-
ance of the trustworthiness of AI. We argue that being accountable
to the public in ways that earn their trust, through elaborating rules
for AI and developing resources for enforcing these rules, is what
will ultimately make AI trustworthy enough to be woven into the
fabric of our society.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is commonly stated as fact that trust in AI is important. It is
true, more than other digital technologies, AI has a moral valence
that demands trust. Fairness, for example, is not merely an abstract
concept or guiding principle of "trustworthy AI” [11]; AI has mate-
rial consequences in the world that affect real people and reflect
often longstanding structural inequities. Distrust in this context
has “rhetorical power” [20], drawing attention to the ways in which
AI fails to live up to our cherished societal values and demanding
that we do better.
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This is not the reason typically given for the importance of trust
in AI. That reason is, in contrast, instrumental: trust is presumed
to be necessary for AI adoption (e.g. [4, 18, 21, 26, 30, 41, 46, 48]).
Distrust is, therefore, an inconvenience, a barrier to realizing the
“promise” of AI through widespread uptake [1, 11]. This neoliberal
logic of rational choice in a free market depoliticizes important
moral issues surrounding AI and makes it seem as though trust-
worthiness is secondary to whether consumers can be convinced
(even tricked) to adopt it. But this choice is illusory. Can the vast
numbers of individuals who distrust or even fear AI [12, 51] really
reject it? What would that even mean? What member of the public
is consciously "adopting" AI? AI is not like a gadget one can pick
up off the shelf or an app in an app store. AI is embedded within
digital technologies, or even more insidiously, within the digital
economy. Very soon all technologies will have some element of AI;
every decision will be informed by AI. The general public are not
users of AI; they are subject to AI. Consequently, lack of public trust
in AI will not express itself in market forces; public distrust will not
function as a corrective toward industry self-regulation of these
technologies, impelling companies who develop and utilize AI to
do better. So as AI becomes an increasingly unavoidable part of the
fabric of society, what guarantee do we have of its trustworthiness?
In this paper, we argue that there is good reason for the public
not to trust AI absent the development of regulatory structures
that afford genuine accountability. Our focus is on public trust, for
which understandings of trust appear both underdeveloped and
eminently important for the reasons described in the opening to
this paper. To date, the field of Trusted AI has focused on develop-
ing tools to provide access to indicators of trustworthiness, such
as whether outputs are reliable, un-biased, and understandable. A
growing body of work seeks to develop resources for a) experts
who train AI models and thus require a means of identifying and
correcting errors in these models, and for b) decision makers, par-
ticularly those in high-stakes decision making contexts, who need
to understand the processes that produced the algorithmic outputs
they depend on. Such approaches presume a user is forging a trust
relationship with a specific, discrete, identifiable AI. This does not
describe the relationship members of the public have with AI. The
public encounters AI often without any awareness of having done
so, and without any means of assessing its trustworthiness—such is
the nature of existence in a world of pervasive AI. Even if the mem-
bers of the public could cultivate greater cognizance of interacting
with AI, their ability to form individual trust relationships with
any of them diminishes as both the complexity and sheer number
of AIs increases. We contend, therefore, that the public can only
meaningfully relate to AI as an abstraction, what we are calling
“AI-as-an-institution”, which has important implications for how to
succeed in promoting public trust in AI.
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This paper will proceed in the following stages. We begin by
presenting a brief overview of the dominant theoretical orienta-
tion toward trust within Trusted AI literature, and challenge its
applicability to public trust in AI. Next, we draw on literature on
institutional trust in developing a new framework for promoting
public trust in AI. We then describe the pivotal role of externally
auditable AI documentation within this model and the work to be
done to ensure it is effective, and outline a number of actions that
would promote trust in AI-as-an-institution. We end by critically
evaluating the role of explanations in promoting trust in AI, and
exploring the relationship between AI documentation within orga-
nizations and documentation to be developed for external auditing.
This paper offers a theoretical contribution as well as practi-
cal one. Theoretically, we rearticulate institutional trust and the
concept of “facework” as it relates to public trust in AI, revealing
important distinctions between expert trust and public trust in AI;
and practically, we explore the implications of institutional trust,
demonstrating that public trust in AI will arise only through de-
velopment of a robust regulatory ecosystem that provides some
guarantee that the public is protected from harmful consequences
of AI.
2 TRUST IN TRUSTED AI
It is outside the scope of this paper to do a comprehensive treatment
of understandings of trust in the Trusted AI literature—this effort
is undertaken elsewhere (in preparation). As a general characteri-
zation of Trusted AI, however, the field has largely focused on the
presumed inability to trust that which one does not understand.
Explainable AI (xAI)—within which there are a variety of explana-
tion types [39]—seeks to rectify this information gap by, generally,
providing explainees a description of how a model or algorithm
inside a “black box” functions [49], or why a particular decision or
outcome was reached. This points to a key assumption about trust
formation, namely that it has a largely cognitive basis [32]. It is this
orientation that we turn to now. We focus on a model of trust in
AI recently proposed by Toreini et al. [48], which synthesizes and
builds on related scholarship, in order to highlight key points of
difference that arise in the context of public trust in AI. This is not
intended as a critique of Toreini et al’s model, but rather an urgent
cautioning against its applicability to the matter of public trust1.
Toreini et al. [48] choose the “widely accepted” ABI (Ability,
Benevolence, Integrity) framework as a launching point for ex-
ploring trust in AI. These three characteristics are thought to be
determinative of a trustee’s trustworthiness, and the trustor’s role
is to assess whether a person is capable of delivering against expec-
tations, intends to do so, and adheres to principles in a consistent
way that make it likely they will do so [34]. The model proposed by
Toreini et al. [48] assumes that ABI (plus Predictability [44]) is gen-
erally applicable to the formation of trust in AI, though complicated
by an additional layer comprised of humane qualities, environmen-
tal qualities, and technological qualities (HET). Humane qualities
might include, for example, individual differences in risk tolerance
or trusting stance, which make a trustor either more less likely to
1Note that the authors do not claim their model applies to the public. By neglecting
to specify relevant trustors, however, the implication would seem this model should
apply equally to all trustors.
trust AI, independent of its ostensibly objective trustworthiness.
Environmental qualities account for cultural variations between
deployment contexts—a sense that “everything is in proper order”
(“situational normality”) and the existence of various guarantees
on trustworthiness (“structural assurances”), such as contracts and
regulations, are conducive to trust [46]. Technological qualities,
lastly, “determine the capacity of the technology itself to deliver the
outcome as promised” [48]. (Though the authors do not describe it
as such, these HET qualities seem to recapitulate ABI—respectively,
Benevolence, Integrity and Ability—representing another sense-
check on trustworthiness.) An additional temporal dimension is
included, recognizing a difference in requirements for initial trust
building and maintenance of trust [32]. The authors ultimately use
the model to propose that technologies that make contributions
to AI fairness, explainability, auditability and safety (FEAS) foster
trust in AI by virtue of improving AI trustworthiness—the preemi-
nence of trustworthiness being a near universal feature of Trusted
AI literature. Completing the model, FEAS is seen to draw from and
implement principles of ethical AI, suggesting that being “ethical”
is relevant to determining an AI’s overall trustworthiness insofar
as it is an aspect of benevolence.
The seminal work of Mayer et al. [34], which originated the ABI
model, is now cited over 22,500 times, a testament to its profound
influence on understandings of antecedents and outcomes of orga-
nizational trust. Trust in organizational contexts is a lubricant of
effective cooperation between individuals in working relationships
with one another, and while this has been picked up as a means
of understanding trust in technology more generally, its not clear
that a model designed to describe trust in that context is readily
transferable to a technology context—at least for the context of
public trust in AI, which is our specific interest here. For one, it is
oddly anthropomorphic to confer ability, benevolence and integrity
to machines; though this complication is conveniently side-stepped
if one assumes that trust in AI is a proxy for trust in the people who
developed the AI (an argument questioned by [33]). Further, the
model alludes to three stages, articulated [44] as belief (formed on
the basis of perceptions of ability, benevolence and integrity), deci-
sion (a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to risk), and action
(taking on that risk); meanwhile ongoing observation of outcomes
informs perceptions of predictability, which circle back to help with
calibration of trust beliefs (cf. [43]). Taking these three stages as
given, Toreini et al.’s model implies that while an AI’s “inherent
trustworthiness” [48] may not result in trust for a variety of reasons,
trust results when progression through these stages leads one to
determine that AI is sufficiently trustworthy for their purposes.
Let us suppose for a moment that this is a largely accurate por-
trayal of an individual’s journey to trusting AI; it is then problematic
that members of the public are severely limited in their ability to
process trust at multiple points along this path:
• Belief (ABI+): This presumes a level of expertise on the part of
the individual to be able to meaningfully assess trustworthi-
ness and an ongoing commitment to monitoring predictabil-
ity. As Toreini et al. [48] rightly point out, there are a number
of stages in the machine learning pipeline that would need
to be considered within such an assessment for one to be in
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a position to form well-placed trust2. The public has neither
this expertise nor capacity when it comes to individual AIs,
let alone for all the myriad and ever increasing number of
AIs in their lives. Moreover, this feedback between observed
behavior and belief, which can either strengthen or diminish
trust in organizational contexts, is also questionable with
respect to AIs given the difficulties the public faces in even
recognizing when they are interacting with AIs.
• Decision: The willingness to make oneself vulnerable to risk
presumes that one is sufficiently capable of understanding
what those risks are. Moreover, “risk” is too simplistic for
this context. “Deciding” whether AI is generally good for
society is qualitatively different from, for example, deciding
whether one opens oneself up to too great a risk in relying on
a colleague to perform a specific task. While Toreini et al’s
[48] model clearly seeks to account for ethical deliberations,
it is not clear that such deliberations lend themselves to
decisions premised in notions of risk.
• Action:Mayer et al’s [34] model clearly implies a choice to act
or not act. If by “act” onemeans adopt or consent to be subject
to AI, the public cannot be said to make such choices. Toreini
et al. [48] attempt to resolve this by noting that there can be
dissonance between beliefs, decisions and actions, resulting
in “as if trust” [54], though this leaves unresolved the issue
of why, if the final result is the same, trust beliefs or decisions
even matter. Also, to the extent that accountability relies on
parties being able to act (e.g. sanction untrustworthy actions
on the part of the trustee), the irrelevance of action here
removes a critical “mechanism to facilitate better behavior”
[53] (see also [7, 14]), which would typically feed a virtuous
cycle for trust.
For these reasons, a new model is needed to account for public
trust/distrust in AI. In what follows, we provide a foundation upon
which to construct a more appropriate understanding for this alto-
gether different context of pervasive AI, where the assessment of
trustworthiness simply does not scale.
3 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
In broad terms, our concern is to do with the issues of scaling
human-computer trust to our technologically “complex” lives. This
problem holds for ubiquitous computing generally, and it is surpris-
ing that models of trust in ubiquitous computing have focused more
on issues to do with people being separated in space [13, 28, 29, 45]
than accounting for aspects of “systemness”. We focus here on how
individuals’ trust (or distrust) of AI is based in its “systemness”,
thereby overcoming the problem of not being able to forge trust in
specific AIs.
We need not invent novel trust mechanisms here. Sociological
scholarship provides useful insights into how humans readily man-
age trust in such circumstances, having already grappled with the
problem of trust in late modern societies. Because the effort re-
quired to forge and manage interpersonal trust relationships does
not scale to the level of social complexity in late modern societies,
2Toreini et al. [48] acknowledge limitations of individuals’ capabilities with respect
to assessing ability and benevolence, and propose that individuals accomplish this
indirectly through assessment of the ability and benevolence of the entity developing
the AI. This is similar to, but does not go as far as, the model we propose in this paper.
a different basis for social order emerges from “system trust (i.e.,
trust in the functioning of bureaucratic sanctions and safeguards,
especially the legal system)” [31]. Individuals do not develop trust
in these systems through careful and ongoing assessment of their
trustworthiness; instead, one trusts that the system itself has appro-
priate mechanisms for ensuring trustworthiness [17, 27].
Our discussion is rooted in Giddens’ structuration theory3, which
understands societal structures (e.g. expert systems, or institutions)
as “both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively
organize” [16]. In other words, “systemness,” as we described it
above, is something that is dynamically negotiated through di-
mensions of structure. “Structuration”, i.e. this interplay between
structure and its reproduction, is often used synonymously with
“institutionalization” [5], and we find it useful to speak of trust in
“AI-as-an-institution” as a means of signalling a key difference be-
tween the kind of trust that is relevant to the context of pervasive AI
(as the public experiences it) and that which experts might have in
individual AIs. But to be perfectly clear, our use of the phrase “insti-
tutional trust” should not confused with trust in the organizations
that produce or employ AI. The institution is the wider ecosystem
that determines the rules that these organizations abide by and the
resources for enforcing those rules; so trust in AI-as-an-institution
would be based in a perception that the system creates conditions for
organizations to develop sufficiently trustworthy AIs and to employ
them responsibly.
Another way of explaining this is to say that when one is trusting
an abstract system (such as an institution), one is trusting in the
system’s structures, i.e. “the rules and resources that govern its
working and its continuous reproduction in the form of regular
social practices” [27]. So what are these dimensions of structure
that comprise institutions? Giddens refers to these as signification,
legitimation, and domination [17]:
Signification refers to the implicit language of symbols and
symbolic actions that derive their meaning in reference to
the institution. A classic example is a white coat that signifies
a doctor [25]. People draw on their understandings of how
the world works (e.g. doctors wear white coats; doctors exist
in hospitals; a person in a hospital wearing a white coat is a
doctor) to infer meaning from these symbols.
Legitimation provides norms (i.e. rules that govern appropri-
ate actions) and values which are known to agents in the
institution. These norms and values are made visible and
are reinforced by institutional sanctions of failures of its
members to embody these expectations [27].
Domination refers to the ways that power can be applied,
which depends on the degree to which agents within the
institution are empowered. Agents are empowered through
a) allocative resources, which grant them certain control
over material objects, and through b) authoritative resources,
which grant them power over other agents [27].
Trust arises in part from a perception of coherence between
these dimensions [27]—resonating with scholarship on trust that
emphasises the importance of integrity [34]. More than this, how-
ever, each structure is subject to breakdown so must be seen to be
3See [25] for an overview of uses of structuration theory in information systems
research.
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functioning in ways that ensure trustworthiness of the system. If
individuals breaking the rules are not punished for doing so, the
norms and values claimed by the institution lose their legitimacy. If
symbolic actions are subject to wide ranging interpretations, these
lose their communicative value. Finally, agents need to be seen as
sufficiently empowered in their roles to be able to exert power; and
at the same time, trust is stronger when power is seen to be subject
to checks and balances provided by the system itself, rather than
relying on the benevolence of individual powerful agents [27].
The question remains as to how trust in institutions grows. For
this, we turn to the concept of facework, originally developed by
Goffman [19] in relation to self-presentation, reformulated by Gid-
dens [17] with respect to concerns about trust in abstract systems,
and rearticulated by Kroeger [27] to explain the development of in-
stitutional trust. Goffman defines face as: “the positive social value
a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume
he has taken” [19]; thus facework is “actions taken by a person
to make whatever he is doing consistent with face” [19]. Giddens
conceives of facework as a mechanism for building up trust in “face-
less commitments” (i.e. “abstract systems”) [17]—its function is to
bridge the gulf between the mechanics of trust operating commonly
between individuals, which are “sustained by or expressed in social
connections established in circumstances of copresence” [17], and
trust that operates in socially “disembedded” contexts. This is ac-
complished, Giddens argues, “by experts and other representatives
at the access points of these abstract systems” [17]. Building on
Giddens, Kroeger rearticulates facework as “the translation of inter-
personal trust into trust which pertains to an institutional system,
based on the conduct of system representatives who, using their
agency, are seen to draw on the system’s rules and resources in
devising behaviours able to signal trustworthiness” [27] (italics re-
moved). In order to promote trust, therefore, representatives of the
institution need to “visibly draw on, and reproduce, dimensions of
structure which determine the trustworthiness of the institutional
system” [27].
4 DEVELOPING A MODEL
Drawing from this structurationist understanding of the basis for
trust in institutions, we now endeavor to provide a model of public
trust in AI-as-an-institution. It should be noted at the outset that
we do not contend that AI-as-an-institution has been deliberately
designed to have particular structural qualities—indeed, we suggest
that a failure to consider the institutional nature of public trust in AI
has left these dimensions severely underdeveloped. This, however,
does not undermine the legitimacy of the model. While signals of
institutional trustworthiness can be intentionally “given” through
purposeful representation, they are also “unintentionally ‘given
off”’ [27], and observers cannot help but infer structural qualities
of the institution [27]. It is our thesis that lack of public trust in
AI has little to do with people’s inability to understand how AIs
work; rather it is a response to an awareness of a lack of structural
assurances of the trustworthiness of the AIs pervading society.
4.1 Structures
In understanding the public’s tendency to distrust AI, it is important
to look at what the public believes AI is and does and how these
beliefs affect attitudes toward these technologies; how this relates
to what AI actually is and does; and how a mismatch between the
two may have arisen. The first thing to note of AI is that whatever
it is now, it has been built up in the public imagination as a thing to
be feared, a cautionary tale of human hubris. Perceptions of AI are
“informed by long-standing cultural imaginaries of machines that
escape the control of their creators, and the promises and perils
of automata and artificial life” [12]. First impressions, which are
considered so important to trust formation [32, 35, 36], have al-
ready been made, and they are not positive. This means that the
public begins from a trust deficit that must be overcome, perhaps by
means not required of other contexts of technological trust building
(cf. [32]). Fears of AI are exacerbated, Elish & Boyd argue [12], by
hyping (in order to sell) the technology. It is frequently marketed
as working “like magic”, feeding a sense that AI is beyond human
comprehension and thus unaccountable to its creators. Anthropo-
morphic language also plays a part in fueling anxieties. Meant to
translate technically complex functions into comprehensible be-
haviors, the language used in marketing and media imbues AI with
human capabilities it does not in fact have, such as “thinking”—the
effect of which is to present AI as having agency beyond the control
of its human developers, playing directly into the science fiction
narrative of AI’s inevitable domination of the human race. Media
coverage of scandals such as Cambridge Analytica portrays AI as a
weapon wielded by the powerful to hijack democracy through AI-
enabled mind control. This narrative has attached itself to AI: “As
with any potent frame, the story that an AI system has been built
to manipulate the public’s hive mind is hard rhetoric to combat”
[12]. And public spectacles such as the Facebook Congressional
hearings make it clear that elected public officials are so limited in
their technical knowledge that they can hardly be trusted to craft
meaningful legislation in this space nor mete out sanctions against
companies found to be acting unethically.
It is against this backdrop that structural questions gain salience.
Legitimation: Who or what is determining the values that might
guide the development of AI toward moral ends? What visible
sanctions have been applied that might reveal a normative culture
within the AI sector? Are my own values reflected in that culture?
Domination: What laws are in place to protect the public from
harm? Are they enforceable? Who or what is empowered to sanc-
tion AI? To whom are AIs ultimately accountable? Signification:
What would be indicative of ethical or trustworthy AI? How do we
know when we see unethical AI? How do certain features of AI
translate to social harms?
These questions, of course, are not new.What the structurationist
lens provides is a newway of understanding the importance of ongo-
ing work in the area of Trusted AI. Legitimation: The avalanche
of corporate, non-governmental and (inter-)governmental state-
ments on principles to guide ethical AI [24, 38, 47] are attempts
at articulating face by defining a set of positive values claimed
by AI-as-an-institution. Where they fall short is in prescribing or
even indicating normative implementation of these principles—a
shortcoming much lamented in the literature [52]. Signification:
The exigence of AI documentation methodologies and toolkits are
attempts at rendering interpretable AI features in a way that visi-
bly reflect an AI’s adherence to trustworthy AI principles, thereby
actively constructing a language for representing abstract social
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constructs such as “fairness”. Domination: Calls to develop a regu-
latory ecosystem for trustworthy AI [11] indicate a growing aware-
ness of the need for external auditing of AI by technically competent
regulators who are empowered to enforce laws and regulations.
The work of developing this ecosystem remains to be done.
In what follows we focus on AI documentation as the key to en-
abling this regulatory ecosystem and thus providing the necessary
conditions for public trust in AI to grow.
4.2 AI documentation to date
Documentation has long been essential practice within software en-
gineering, and it is no surprise that AI would need to be thoroughly
documented. Recent efforts to standardize AI documentation cap-
ture information related to the safety and performance testing an
AI has undergone [3, 22], performance characteristics and intended
use cases of algorithms [37, 42] and details of algorithms’ training
datasets [6, 15, 23] that are relevant to determining the contexts
within which the AI can be responsibly applied. These differ from
standard software engineering documentation in that they are de-
signed “to address ethical and legal concerns and general social
impacts of such systems” [42] by providing transparency on key
facts regarding the AI’s development.
AI documentation is ideally (if still rarely) used within internal
governance practices across the whole AI lifecycle. As an artifact,
documentation can improve communication within a team—in par-
ticular regarding teammembers’ individual impacts on the resulting
product—and can be used to illustrate and argue the need for ad-
ditional resources to ensure the AI lives up to ethical standards;
and as a process, it encourages individuals to consider ethical im-
plications (either directly or indirectly through associated technical
evidence) throughout the product’s development [40]. In short, AI
documentation helps ensure that the AI being developed conforms
to organizations’ own values and standards.
While there are notable exceptions for the use of AI in already
highly regulated sectors (e.g. finance), it is generally true that AI
documentation has not been developed for the purposes of exter-
nal auditing. No doubt AI documentation is informed by emerging
guidelines for trustworthy AI, but compliance with these guidelines
is entirely voluntary. Certainly companies have an inherent drive to
avoid reputational damage and might seek to self-certify their trust-
worthiness through processes of documentation4, but for reasons
outlined in the introduction, this is not a sufficient basis for trust
in AI-as-an-institution. Public trust in AI will emerge when power
resides in the institution itself, rather than in the power (and benev-
olence) of a number of organizations committed to trustworthy AI.
And having now described the structural conditions which support
trust in institutions, AI documentation in its current form does not
provide sufficient structural guarantees of AI’s trustworthiness. In
what follows, however, we argue that AI documentation can play a
critical role in impelling compliance with sector-wide guidelines
and legislation, and can indeed be the appropriate mechanism for
AI-as-an-institution to ensure trustworthiness of individual AIs.
4Note that efforts such as Denmark’s Data Ethics Seal [10] and Malta’s voluntary
certification system for AI [2] are premised in this same notion of the reputational
advantage of trustworthiness.
4.3 The role of algorithmic documentation in
promoting public trust in AI
As critical context for our proposed approach to promoting trust in
AI-as-an-institution, we must first note certain unique challenges
in both documenting and regulating AI (which are, of course, in-
tertwined). In principle, AI products and services are subject to
existing legislation including consumer protection, product safety
and liability, non-discrimination, and data protection (e.g. GDPR)
[11]. These laws relate to the majority of public concerns around
AI, and might provide decent institutional guarantees on trust-
worthiness were it not for the fact that these laws are notoriously
difficult to enforce when it comes to AI. Certain characteristics of
AI (“opacity (‘black box-effect’), complexity, unpredictability and
partially autonomous behaviour” [11]) present major challenges
in evidencing legal compliance and non-compliance. In terms of
non-discrimination law in particular, “AI can use unintuitive proxy
data to make decisions about humans that do not make our ‘alarm
bells’ ring” [9]. The nature of AI being “abstract and unintuitive,
subtle, intangible, and difficult to detect” makes it less likely people
will seek legal recourse for discrimination [50], thus undermining
the legal safeguards ostensibly afforded by the system. Many of
these same issues pertain to so-called “soft-law” [24] (i.e. various
ethical/trustworthy AI guidelines): what does implementation of
principles such as justice, fairness, non-maleficence and privacy
[24] look like, and how will indicators of their successful imple-
mentation be detected?
A major implication of understanding AI as an institution, im-
plicit in this paper up until now, is the need to develop a means of
systematically weeding out AIs deemed harmful (or risky) so that
what remains is trustworthy. Because existing laws have limitations
in this regard, the need for AI-specific legislation that can be more
“effectively enforced” has been raised [11]. Surely, in order that
such legislation has teeth, as the saying goes, one first needs some-
thing to chew on. And this is where AI documentation comes in:
documentation artifacts could provide external auditors with facts
needed for determining the trustworthiness of a given AI in order
to exercise authority (domination). AI-as-an-institution cannot
visibly draw on rules that do not yet formally exist. Thus, agreeing
on what might constitute a “fact” is also critical (signification); as
would be the establishment of a set of normative decisions about
what constitutes legal and ethical non-compliance (legitimation).
Systemic trustworthiness would result from integrity across these
interlocking dimensions of structure. Figure 1 provides an overview
of this basic model for the promotion of trust in AI-as-an-institution
mapped to these structures.
This model offers a new way of envisaging the potential of AI
documentation to promote public trust in AI. While sometimes
likened to food nutrition labels [23, 40, 42], there is little reason to
believe that members of the public would be able to interpret docu-
mentation to make informed decisions about using or being subject
to AI. But members of the public do not need to trust individual AIs
at all (cf. [8]); what they need instead is the sanction of authority
provided by suitably expert auditors that AI can be trusted. In order
for AI documentation to be interpretable by these auditors, a shared
language would need to be established for relating evidence (facts)
to underlying ethical and legal constructs. This likely includes the
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Figure 1: Dimensions of structure and their expression in AI context Adapted from Jones & Karsten, 2000 [25].
Positive Facework Negative Facework
Domination Emphasizing control over AI; referencing
documentation (and external auditing of it)
Promisory rhetorics; public-facing explanations
Legitimation Celebrating good AI and the elimination bad AI;
displaying certification (referencing rigor of
certification process)
Brushing untrustworthy AI under the carpet;
multiplicity of self-certifications by orgnizations
Signification Explaining what the institution means by "trustworthy
AI"; relating this definition to public concerns
Emphasizing purely technical reasons AI is trustworthy;
referencing inconsistencies in interpretations of fairness
Table 1: Examples of positive and negative facework for AI-as-an-institution.
development of both “a standard set of statistical evidence” [50] for
criteria such as fairness—work that is making notable progress in
mapping various interpretations of fairness to computed metrics
—as well as norms for annotating documents with relevant contex-
tual information (cf. “contextual equality” [50])5. Previous work has
proposed a methodology for producing AI FactSheets [42] that con-
vey necessary information to an intended audience, and an obvious
next step would be working with individuals who are sufficiently
knowledgeable of the ethical and legal requirements to understand
what actionable insights they can glean from FactSheets, perhaps
even co-designing FactSheets that are specifically tailored to the
needs of future regulators. Once standards are established for cap-
turing and representing facts, a next step would include initiatives
that seek to enhance skills of “sectoral regulators. . . to effectively
and efficiently implemen[t] relevant rules” [11].
We propose a further need to establish something akin to case
law—i.e. decisions regarding the trustworthiness of specific AIs—
that can be referenced within the documentation. There is need of
active deliberation in the AI community regarding certain AIs that
5This may build on the efforts of creating documentation that communicates intended
use cases [6, 15, 37, 42].
could serve as precedents for both “trustworthy” and “untrustwor-
thy” AI6. This is essential in establishing institutional norms, but
would also help regulators make satisfactorily consistent determina-
tions about the trustworthiness of a given AI, thereby reproducing
these norms. Documentation could, for example, point regulators
to related exemplars, possibly annotated with details of how they
differ from these established cases.
We imagine these components as needing to co-evolve (see Fig-
ure 3). Normative decision making would be built into the docu-
mentation artifacts, which would begin to develop effective ways of
referencing precedent; the language for communicating facts about
an AI would evolve as new exemplars highlight the need to capture
additional or different facts; the documentation itself, by virtue of
what can actually be captured, will shape the way that facts are
communicated; and what facts can be captured will determine what
technical features within AIs prompt sanctions.
One final element of our model remains, namely what positive
facework (i.e. behaviors of representatives of AI-as-an-institution
that promote public trust in AI) might look like. While this is not an
exhaustive list, the following are indicative behaviors to encourage
6As an initial step—i.e. to help catalyze progress toward being able to regulate and
thus make decisions on real AIs—leadership within the AI community could develop a
series of hypothetical AIs as case studies.
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among those who are seen to represent AI-as-an-institution. Domi-
nation: A necessary first step would be contributing to a sense that
AI is within human control, both to help the public appropriately
calibrate their fears and begin to dismantle longstanding cultural
imaginaries. To this end, positive facework would include intention-
ally eschewing “promissory rhetorics” of what AI might one day do
[12] for greater clarity regarding current capabilities and inherent
limitations, communicating how its “intelligence” is constrained
to incredibly specific contexts for which its performance has been
optimized. Positive facework could even be as simple as making it
clear that AIs are being documented. The fact that AI is being docu-
mented means that someone with appropriate skills could examine
the AI for trustworthiness. Legitimation: Other positive facework
would include making an effort to publicly celebrate when harmful
AI is detected and discontinued. This would serve to reinforce a
sense that the system is controlling for trustworthiness, while also
helping articulate the norms that constitute trustworthy AI. Coun-
terbalancing this with stories of AI doing good in society would
prevent against perceptions that AI is threatening by default. AI
certification could be a form of positive facework if it represents
a genuine auditing process. Organizations whose AI receives cer-
tification can do facework by articulating their own commitment
to ethical and trustworthy AI and proudly displaying credentials,
but even more effectively, by emphasizing the credibility of the
underlying certification process. Signification: There is a need,
more fundamentally, to explicate how concerns underlying public
distrust of AI are accounted for within the regulatory environment.
This would mean clarifying what legislation and/or regulators are
controlling for, what kind of indicators auditors look to as evidence
in determining trustworthiness (including guarantees of fact au-
thenticity), and overall why the resulting AI is “trustworthy”. In
this paper we have conspicuously avoided defining “trustworthy”,
in part because this is something the community must feel its way
toward through co-evolution of these dimensions of structure (see
Figure 2 showing the relationship between trustworthiness and
public trust in AI). As this understanding of trustworthy AI evolves,
not only does a shared institutional definition of “trustworthiness”
need to be articulated, but it needs to be articulated in reference
to public concerns about AI. In other words, important facework
would be communicating how the system ensures that AI is trust-




There is a common, but generally unspoken, assumption that ex-
planations of an AI’s inner workings are essential for promoting
trust. One of the key insights emerging from our model is that xAI
actually has no direct role in promoting public trust in AI. Certainly,
if one cannot explain to relevant expert stakeholders, how an AI is
arriving at a decision, that AI should not be allowed to be part of the
decision making process. We see this playing out, for example, in
heavily regulated industries such as finance. The ability to regulate
depends, therefore, on being able to document key aspects of an AI
in ways that render it interpretable to an auditor—the xAI toolset
and fundamental insights generated from the body of xAI may by
Figure 2: Stages in promoting public trust in AI.
applicable to this challenge. But critically, while it is important that
somewhere an element of structure accounts for what is happening
inside the black box (e.g. in documentation artifacts), public-facing
explanations of inner workings would not be an example of positive
facework; indeed, we would go so far as to propose such explana-
tions are negative facework and would erode trust in the system.
Attempting to explain to the public how an AI works might subtly
imply that it is necessary for individuals to understand how they
work—either so that the public can make their own decisions about
which AI is trustworthy, or so that they can “challenge the opera-
tion and outcome of a model” [48]. These are functions that ought
to be fulfilled by the institution itself to ensure trustworthiness so
that members of the public do not need any technical knowledge
of AI to be able to live their lives unharmed by it.
We are not, however, claiming that the public should not be
able to scrutinize or challenge an AI. In fact, lawsuits brought by
the public or public advocates would be an important force for
advancing norms (i.e. helping to grow a ‘case repository’) for AI.
But as noted by Wieringa [53], “The transparent workings of a
system do not tell you why it was deemed ‘good enough’ at decision
making, or why it was deemed desirable to begin with. . .Nor does
it tell us anything about its specifications or functions, nor who
decided on these, nor why.” This is the sort of information that
would be provided by documentation artifacts, which would more
appropriately service public accountability than a necessarily overly
simplistic model of how the AI works (cf. [39]). Another way of
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Figure 3: Co-evolution of structural dimensions and the
role of organizational documentation practices (SDoCs and
ERBs).
saying this is that explanation is insufficient for accountability; the
public does not need to know how an AI works in order to trust it,
but rather needs to know that someone with the necessary skillset
for understanding decisions made throughout the AI lifecycle has
the resources needed for examining AI and the authority to enforce
decisions regarding the its trustworthiness.
5.2 Beyond component level documentation
It is worth stating explicitly that AI does not provide total solutions;
rather it provides intelligent components of systems. Concern over
these intelligent components often obscures the overall systems in
which these AIs operate. What matters to the user of any system is
not how the system works, but that it works. Users do not worry
about the chips in their computers because it is irrelevant to their
operating of the machine. Similarly, AI documentation would need
to provide a fundamental assurance that the AI meets standards
sufficiently well to be used within a system. Comparing AI doc-
umentation with a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDoC)
makes sense for this limited purpose [3, 22]. As with semiconduc-
tor standards that ensure that chip-level components will operate
within certain environmental limits and provide reliable function-
ality as specified, documentation would need to show how the AI
meets the requirements of those integrating AI components within
their systems.
But this raises an important question: If an AI component con-
tributes to a decision, should it matter that the AI component is
biased if that bias is compensated for by a human in the loop? The
AI bias would absolutely matter to the person whose job it is to in-
tegrate that component into a system, as they would need to devise
ways of handling that bias7. But for the recipient of a decision, such
as a member of the public, the system could be trustworthy even
while the AI lacks guarantees of trustworthiness, and vice versa—a
perfectly functional component does not guarantee a trustworthy
system. By “communicat[ing] performance levels of the service. . . in
a standardized and transparent manner” [3], SDoC’s make it more
likely that AI systems will be developed to be trustworthy because
organizations developing AI systems would have the necessary
information to purchase trustworthy components and implement
them appropriately. As such, they would be an integral part of a
trustworthy AI ecosystem; but do ‘chip level’ matters (e.g. accuracy
with respect to a test dataset) meaningfully relate to public con-
cerns about AI? The public, after all, is not worrying about the
components; they are worrying about the systems that use AI.
Ethics review boards are beginning to emerge within large orga-
nizations, and have a different set of concerns than those of that a
system integrator might have. Typically, these boards are driven
by concerns about risk, reporting to an organization’s Chief Risk
Officer. What an ethics review board would need to see in terms of
documentation is both different to a SDoC and closer to the level
of lay public concerns about AI. (When it comes to documentation,
one size does not fit all.) While again these ERBs contribute to the
trustworthiness of AI, we are not suggesting that ethics review
boards provide sufficient structural assurance for public trust in AI,
as these processes are still internal to a given organization—though
in developing documentation artifacts that could be used for the
purposes of external auditing by independent regulatory bodies,
they might serve as a good starting point for considering AI impacts
beyond the component level. As critical as it is to develop documen-
tation that supports external auditing, however, documentation
practices internal to organizations developing AI make important
contributions to promoting AI that is worthy of public trust (see
Figure 3).
6 CONCLUSION
We have argued in this paper for the need to undertake a major
effort towards developing standardized documentation8 that em-
powers external auditors to sanction AI in accordance with public
notions of trustworthiness. Fostering public trust in AI is not simply
a case of mastering Explainable AI. It is not the public’s responsibil-
ity to keep AI honest. That is the responsibility of specially trained
individuals who are skilled enough to make determinations about
trustworthiness. Nor it it simply a case of standardizing various
performance metrics for AI components and developing internal AI
governance practices. Organizations developing AI have a responsi-
bility to implement AI components appropriately and ensure their
systems live up to ethical standards, but public trust requires some
authority that impels organizations to take these responsibilities se-
riously and to validate their interpretation of these standards. Public
trust requires the development of a wider infrastructure that creates
7A simple example of compensating for untrustworthy AI components would be to
develop a workflow that specifies to ignore a prediction if confidence drops by a certain
level.
8This does not conflict with the argument in [42] that documentation standards
will be somewhat different for different stakeholders in different organizations and
different industry sectors, but does suggest that there is an inherent tension between
standardization and customization that needs to be brought into balance over time.
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conditions for worthy AI to thrive: an entire system of rules needs
developing, alongside resources that empower suitably-skilled in-
dividuals to enforce those rules. Succeeding in this undertaking
will take intensive interdisciplinary collaboration in translating
high-level principles of trustworthy AI into standards that can be
satisfactorily accounted for in documentation of all systems that
include AI components.
As challenging as this will no doubt be, there is no shortcut to
public trust in AI. It is tempting to focus on the component level,
to work on making sure that AI is trustworthy whether or not
the public believes it so. (After all, the public has no choice but to
“accept” AI, even if they distrust it.) But this is to miss a key point
about the relationship between trust and trustworthiness: seeking
to earn trust forces one to become more trustworthy. Ultimately,
being accountable to the public in ways that earn their trust is what
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